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Why the Taint to Religion?: 
The Interplay of Chance and Reason 
Richard Stith* 
As usual, Professor Durham has offered a profound and 
careful analysis of the treatment of religion in  American 
society.' I want to  ask more about why an epistemological 
privileging of a secular outlook, a tainting of a religious 
outlook, exists in the United States. Professor Durham cited 
the creation science cases as excluding plausible theories of 
biogenesis which betray a religious or igh2 The phenomenon of 
exclusion of religion is, however, quite general. There is a taint 
to religious values, symbols, and organizations whenever they 
appear in public. Our courts insist that religion can have no 
public role as part of a state agency o r  of a private group 
backed by extensive state inv~lvement.~ The result, as 
Professor Durham points out, is that on the one hand religious 
people feel marginalized and ignored; on the other hand, the 
whole community is deprived of a resource for implementing 
public programs that require or instill virtue.4 The demise of 
religious schools, for example, would be bad from many secular 
points of view, yet such schools can receive no public support, 
even for essential public purposes. 
My question is this: Is the taint that we have lived with in 
this country-growing out of the Establishment Clause- 
* hofessor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. Copyright 1993 by 
Richard Stith. AU rights resewed. This article was written in response to that of 
b Professor Cole Durham, infra note 1, for the meeting of the International Legal 
Science Association, Provo, Utah, Sept. 10-13, 1992. 
1. See W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism, 
and the Transformative Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
421. 
2. See id. at 44-45; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 US. 97 (1968). 
3. See Larkin v. GrendePs Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). 
4. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US. 602 (1971). 
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accidental to  our history, o r  does it have a rational basis? This 
question is important because it affects the kind of advice or 
example that we can give to nations that are developing or 
reformulating their constitutions. If the values in our 
Establishment Clause are merely the result of chance historical 
events, other nations should be able to find alternatives to our 
constitutional principles. But if the values in  our 
Establishment Clause are fundamental to modern society, 
perhaps they should be everywhere promulgated. 
Let me give some examples and reasons why it sometimes 
appears to me that our situation is accidental. We struggle t o  
keep American public schools free of religion, but the Federal 
Republic of Germany, a nation with high ideals of individual 
equality and freedom, lives peacefully with religion being 
taught in the public schools. This religious presence does not 
seem to be significantly controversial among Germans. Why 
does religion in schools raise such bright red flags for 
Americans? Why should this upset us so much, when it does 
not upset the Germans? 
Another source of possibly unnecessary tension between 
church and state is the U.S. federal income tax code. Professor 
Durham did not discuss the code in his paper, although it may 
be even more important than the Establishment Clause, or 
Employment Division v. Smith,' in limiting freedom of religion. 
No religious group that receives a tax exemption, or whose 
donors get tax deductions, can be involved in elections6 This 
tremendously inhibits religious groups from participating in 
public life. Yet it is my understanding that these sections of the 
tax code were in part ad hoe measures intended to strike back 
at a private nonreligious foundation which had dared to  
support an opponent of Senator Lyndon B. J ~ h n s o n . ~  The 
provisions did not express some deliberate, well-thought-out 
principle meant to place a vise around religious activity. By 
accident, as it were, the tax code has imposed major limitations 
on religious freedom. 
5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also Durham & Dushku, supra note 1, at 447-55. 
6. See I.R.C. $8 501(c)(3), 170(c)(2) (1988). 
7. Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., On Not Rendering to Caesar The 
Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations 
Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 23-29 (1990). 
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Another example comes from my hometown of Valparaiso 
(Indiana, not Chile). Each Christmas season we have a live 
nativity scene on the courthouse grounds which is entertaining 
for the whole town, especially the children. Some local 
residents dress up as Mary, Joseph, and the shepherds, and 
there are often live sheep. I t  gets pretty cold, so I don't think 
they have a real child, but one year they brought in some 
camels. Anyway, viewing this community celebration as 
something that ought t o  be protested seems to me 
extraordinarily hypersensitive, if not small-hearted. Yet o u r  
law would give such protesters strong ba~k ing .~  
On the other hand, some events a t  our town courthouse 
seem much more offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities; 
yet our law provides no remedy. A few years ago, we erected 
what some people call the "Rusty Butterfly" in front of the 
courthouse. It is a modern sculpture which probably does not 
agree with the taste of a majority of the people of Valparaiso, 
and they do not like the fact that public space and public funds 
have been spent on a sculpture that is meaningless to them. (I 
should say that I like it; so I'm not grinding my own axe here.) 
Furthermore, these townspeople are offended by the fact that 
the sculpture replaced a war memorial. Something quite dear 
to the hearts of those people whose relatives had died in the 
First World War was replaced by the Rusty Butterfly. But this 
intrusion into the public realm of an idiosyncratic aesthetic 
value, of a particular personal preference for a modern 
sculpture over a war memorial, is not actionable in the courts. 
Now, why should we be so sensitive to people who are upset by 
the nativity scene and not to those upset by the sculpture? This 
position of our law strikes me prima facie as accidental. I t  does 
not make sense, if one were designing a polity from scratch, to 
purposely draw such a line. 
Perhaps this strange stance is the result of an accident of 
incorporation, the Supreme Court's decision to read the First 
Amendment into the Fourteenth. Mary AM Glendon and Raul 
Yanes argued recently that the incorporation cases were not 
well thought out.9 They imply that if the Court had been more 
reflective, it might have incorporated the Establishment Clause 
8. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
9. Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 477, 479-92 (1991). 
470 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
differently.1° Here, in my opinion, is a more reasonable 
version of incorporation: The Clause providing that Congress 
may make no law respecting an establishment of religion was 
originally intended not only to exclude a federal establishment 
of religion, but also to forbid federal interference with the 
various establishments of religion that were then in place a t  
the state level." The Framers did not mean to articulate the 
principles of a polity but rather, in many ways, the principles 
of an international treaty. The real foundations of common life, 
including religion, were left to the several states. Now, it seems 
to me that when the Establishment Clause was incorporated, 
the state~local relationship should simply have replaced the 
federdstate relationship. Thus no state should be able to 
establish or favor a particular religion. But just as the federal 
government, at the time of the First Amendment's ratification, 
had to respect state establishments of religion, state 
governments should now likewise have to respect towns and 
other local communities that have a religious identity. 
Religiously expressive communities should be able to 
participate in public programs, receive public benefits, and 
have their symbols part of a public holiday display, as long as 
there is no pattern of official state preference for one particular 
religion.12 But the Court missed its chance to adopt this better 
theory of incorporation. 
Did our hostility to public religion really have to happen? 
Another thought experiment illustrates the seemingly 
accidental nature of Establishment doctrines. Assume the 
Framers had been truly farsighted and had realized that in the 
twentieth century our strongest passion would not be religion 
but sport. They might have drafted the First Amendment to  
read, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of sport." (The words of the Free Exercise Clause could have 
remained almost the same as they are now, but they would 
10. Id. at 481. 
11. See id. at 482. 
12. This proposal may seem akin to Professor Worthen's suggestion that the 
Constitution ought to apply differently to local institutions than to state or 
national institutions. See Kevin J Worthen, The Role of Local Governments in 
Striking the Proper Balance Between Individualism and Communitarianism: Lessons 
for and from Americans, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 475, 490. My argument is, however, 
restricted to the Establishment Clause. After incorporation, localities could not 
claim any special protection from the free speech part of the First Amendment, in 
my view, because the original unincorporated First Amendment did not in itself 
provide any protection for states which limited speech. 
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have guaranteed "the right to exercise freely.") Courts might 
later have created a high and impregnable wall of separation 
between sport and state. Such a legal setup could have given 
rise to genuinely perceived injuries and conflicts. I suppose 
some Californians would be upset with the current mayor of 
San Francisco. How dare he try to float public bond issues and 
do other favors for the Giants in order to keep them in San 
Francisco?13 Such actions are none of his business. And what 
about fairness to basketball fans? Some nonsporty types might 
even get annoyed when the President of the United States 
throws out a baseball .to start the season. Is he trying to say 
that baseball is the national pastime? 
I am serious in my attempt at humor because I do think 
we are conditioned, as Mary Ann Glendon puts it, by "the 
stories told by the law."14 If the law tells us that we should be 
offended in certain circumstances, then some of us will discover 
that we are offended. We all have so many resentments against 
others-against anything that intrudes upon our preferences- 
that if we are told that a particular intrusion is illegitimate, we 
fight back. But what the law tells us may sometimes be a 
historical accident. 
111. A RATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR THE 
ESTABLISHMENT DOCTRINE 
Professor Durham is also correct, however, in pointing out 
that some tension between religion and secularity is universal, 
a t  least in the modern world.15 Perhaps the language of the 
law is only the occasion, rather than the deep cause, of our 
current hostility toward "establishing" religion. Perhaps the 
'law's stories" are simply a match tossed into an already 
flammable public consciousness. 
Professor Durham argues that one underlying reason for 
sacred-secular tensions is a project of the Enlightenment.16 
Enlightened modernity has sought to give final form t o  the first 
of the two ways of  thinking with which Professor Durham 
13. See Hank Hersch, Tale of Four Cities: For Giants Fans in Two Bay Areas, 
It Is the Best of Times, It Is the Worst of Times, SPoffTs ILLUSPRATED, Aug. 24, 
1992, at 24. 
14. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 8-9 
(1987). 
15. Durham & Dushku, supra note 1, at 425, 426-37. 
16. See id. at 443-44. 
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begins his paper. It has sought to construct a universally 
convincing, scientific, political rationality that would maximize 
the values of efficiency, national unity, and private freedom.'' 
Here I must disagree on one point with Professor Durham 
and with others whose work I otherwise admire. I do not think 
the purpose of the Establishment Clause can be limited just to 
protecting free exercise of religion.'' If a religion were 
established, it could interfere with our lives in many 
nonreligious ways. If a vegetarian religion were enforced, I 
could no longer eat meat. My religion does not necessarily tell 
me to eat meat, but maybe I like meat or I think my children 
need protein in the form of meat to stay healthy. So the 
Establishment Clause can easily be seen as part of a broader 
project of excluding religion from public life in order to base 
lawmaking on rational, universally acknowledged principles. If 
the irrationalities and traditions of religion are kept out, 
private freedom will not be unnecessarily restricted. The 
problem is that this supposed universally convincing rationality 
does not convince religious adherents. Because they persist in 
asserting backward, unreasonable beliefs, they must somehow 
be walled out of the public forum. Since religious adherents 
cannot be rationally persuaded, they must be delegitimated. 
Some ad horninem argument must provide a reason why the 
rest of us who are engaged in this enlightened project do not 
have to listen to them and certainly do not have to take into 
account their views and votes. 
I spent a month in Nepal this past year, and the new 
constitution of that country shows that this same process has 
17. Alasdair Mdntyre puts the matter this way: 
It was a central aspiration of the Enlightenment, an aspiration the 
formulation of which was itself a great achievement, to provide for debate 
in the public realm standards and methods of rational justification by 
which alternative courses of action in every sphere of life could be 
adjudged just or unjust, rational or irrational, enlightened or 
unenlightened. So, it was hoped, reason would displace authority and 
tradition. Rational justification was to appeal to principles undeniable by 
any rational person and therefore independent of all those social and 
cultural particularities which the Enlightenment thinkers took to be the 
mere accidental clothing of reason in particular times and places. And 
that rational justification could be nothing other than what the thinkers 
of the Enlightenment had said that it was came to be accepted, at least 
by the vast majority of educated people, in post-Enlightenment cultural 
and social orders. 
ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, WHOSE JUSMCE? WHICH  RATIONAL^? 6 (1988). 
18. But cf. Durham & Dushku, supra note 1, at 459-60. 
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recently taken place there. A few years ago, the united forces of 
the liberals and the leftists nearly overthrew the monarchy.'' 
To avoid a complete revolution and preserve himself, the king 
simply made a deal with these two groups. The leaders of the 
liberals, leftists, and monarchists negotiated a new 
constitution; no constituent assembly was ever elected to 
express the views of the people as a whole. What the three 
bargaining parties agreed upon included a democratic, 
constitutional monarchy and national unity. To these ends, 
they inserted in the constitution a rule that no political party 
may be based, inter alia, on religion, tribe, or regioa20 Of 
course, those are the loyalties closest to Nepalese hearts; they 
were excluded, I think, because they were thought to interfere 
with unity and efficiency. 
IV. THE ACCIDENTAL NATURE OF THIS RATIONALITY 
Let us return to the question of whether it is rational to 
tolerate the Rusty Butterfly but not the live nativity scene. The 
deep purpose of the latter intolerance, I submit, is to 
delegitimate religious arguments and to make it clear that 
those arguments do not require attention, that they have no 
public force, that they may not be aired in a public space. 
Permitting the government to endorse religion, even in a 
symbolic, noncoercive way, is to give religion public legitimacy, 
and who knows where that will lead? The nativity scene has to 
be removed, not because it causes more grievous harm than 
other public value choices, but because of the supposed rational 
need to  delegitimate religion. 
I wonder, however, whether much that passes for 
rationality is not itself transitory, an accident of history. After 
all, the Enlightenment's project has failed.21 The idea of 
developing a universally valid normative science of society, if i t  
was ever persuasive, is not so anymore. Few of us (at least 
outside of law and economics) think that neutral, foundational 
assumptions still exist upon which all reasonable persons of 
good will can agree and upon the basis of which all problems 
19. For general background, see RISWKESH SHAHA, POLITICS IN NEPAL: 1980- 
1990 (1990). 
20. CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL 2047 art. 112(3) (1990); see a k o  Michael 
Hutt, Drafting the Nepal Constitution, 1990, 31 ASIAN SURV. 1020, 1028, 1037 
(1991). 
21. See generally MAcINTYRE, supra note 17. 
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can be rationally solved. Hence there is no longer a principled 
argument for the exclusion of religion. There was once a 
respectable project which made it right to exclude religion from 
the public sphere, but most of us have given up on that 
project.22 
The skepticism that was used to  undermine religion and to 
clear the way for the rational legislator, at  the time of the 
Enlightenment and thereafter, has now turned back on law and 
on reason itself. Postmodern skepticism destroys the bright line 
between the rational and the religious, while undermining any 
new values we might wish 'to cheer. Witness the theoretical 
tension between proponents of minority rights or the rights of 
women and movements like Critical Legal S t ~ d i e s . ~ ~  
Postmodern thought conflicts as much with any sort of 
objective ideal o r  principle as it does with religious 
Since we are all in the same postmodern boat now, there is 
no good reason why religion should continue to be treated as an 
especially irrational and embarrassing part of life. We are all 
equally naked and vulnerable. To continue to taint religion is 
purely a political privileging. There is no longer a credible 
metatheory available that explains why religion should be 
excluded while feminism or some other doctrine is included in 
public life. The time has come t o  stop pretending that there are 
a priori reasons why we do not have to listen to each other. 
22. John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin are two prominent scholars still seeking 
rationally to disenfranchise certain values and worldviews. They have not 
succeeded. See Richard Stith, A Critique of Fairness, 16 VAL. U .  L. REV. 459 
(1982); Richard Stith, WiU There Be a Science of Law in the Twenty-First Century?, 
22 REV. GI~N. 373 (1991), regarding Rawls and Dworkin respectively. 
23. For a description of this tension and an attempt to lessen it, see Dennis 
Patterson, PostmodemismlFeminism/Law, 77 CORNELL . REV. 254 (1992). 
24. Michael Peny now appears to take this position. Although he had 
previously argued otherwise, he recently stated, ''Now I see no good reason to 
exclude any religious beliefs as a basis for a political choice. . . . [Clontroversial 
religious beliefs do not have a different, much less an inferior, epistemological 
status from controversial beliefs of other sorts . . . ." Michael J. Peny, The 
Inclusivist Ideal in Political Choice, WOODSTQCK REP., Mar. 1993, at 7, 8. 
